Before 1960 – The Forgotten Aspiration of Sulu and Mindanao to Join Malaysia

When Malaysia was formed in 1963, its architects envisioned a union of the Malay Peninsula, Sabah (then North Borneo), Sarawak, and Singapore a federation of shared destiny. Yet beneath that official story lies a lesser-known chapter: the early interest among leaders and people in Sulu and Mindanao to be part of a Malay-Muslim nation that would one day become Malaysia.

This aspiration, never formalised into diplomatic proposals, reflected centuries of cultural, religious, and familial bonds across the Malay Archipelago  bonds that colonial borders later fractured. Before 1960, the idea of joining Malaya resonated not as an act of secession, but as a return to a shared civilisational family.

The Malay World Before Colonial Borders

To understand why Sulu and Mindanao looked southward, we must look back to a time before nation-states and colonial maps. The Malay Archipelago  stretching from Sumatra to Borneo, from the southern Philippines to the Malay Peninsula  was bound by trade, language, and Islam.

The Sultanate of Sulu, established in the 15th century, was part of this dynamic Malay-Islamic network. Its rulers intermarried with royal families in Brunei, North Borneo, and even the Malay Peninsula. Religious scholars (ulama) from Patani, Terengganu, and Aceh frequently travelled to Jolo and Cotabato to teach, spreading Islamic law and Malay language across the seas.

Mindanao, too, was home to established Muslim sultanates  Maguindanao and Lanao  whose rulers maintained maritime diplomacy with Malacca, Brunei, and the Arab world. This network formed what historian Najeeb Mitry Saleeby once described as a “confederation of Islamised Malay polities,” connected through faith and kinship rather than geography.

Thus, when Western colonial powers imposed borders  Spain in the Philippines, Britain in Malaya and Borneo  they divided a people who had long considered themselves one ummah serumpun (a community of shared origin).

The Post-War Awakening and the Idea of Malaya

The defeat of Japan in 1945 and the end of Western colonial dominance triggered a wave of nationalist movements across Southeast Asia. In Malaya, the vision of independence took shape around the principles of Malay leadership, Islamic values, and multiracial harmony. When Tunku Abdul Rahman led the Federation of Malaya to independence in 1957, the news reverberated far beyond the peninsula.

In the southern Philippines, Muslim leaders  particularly in Sulu and Mindanao  saw in Malaya a beacon of hope. Here was a newly independent, Muslim-majority nation that had balanced modern governance with respect for Islam and Malay identity.

To the Tausug and Maguindanaon elites who had long felt sidelined by the Christian-dominated Philippine government in Manila, Malaya represented not merely a political entity, but a cultural home. As one Mindanaoan leader reportedly said in the 1950s:

“Malaya is where our blood and faith find peace. Manila looks at us as strangers.”

Roots of Resentment in the Philippine South

The sentiment toward Malaya was also driven by the discontent within the Philippine Muslim south. After the Philippines gained full independence from the United States in 1946, the new government in Manila struggled to integrate its southern territories  regions that had resisted Spanish rule for centuries and had their own governance structures, legal traditions, and faith.

The American colonial legacy had reinforced Christian political dominance, encouraging settlement programs that displaced Muslim communities from fertile lands. The result was a growing sense of alienation among the Moro population  a people who, by history and culture, identified more closely with their Malay-Muslim neighbours than with the Christian north.

By the mid-1950s, many Moro intellectuals and datus began privately discussing whether their future lay with the Philippines  or with a greater Malay world. It was during this period that the term “Bangsa Melayu” gained traction among southern intellectuals, expressing the longing to reconnect with a broader Malay-Islamic identity.

Cross-Sea Connections: The Sulu-Sabah Link

Geographically, the bridge between the Philippines and Malaya was Sabah, then known as North Borneo. Historically, parts of this territory were under the influence or claim of the Sultanate of Sulu, which had received it in the 17th century as a gift from the Sultan of Brunei for military assistance.

The Sulu rulers later leased their North Borneo lands to the British in the late 19th century, but many Tausug and Bajau families continued to migrate and trade across the Sulu Sea. Fishing, barter trade, and even intermarriages between families of Sandakan and Jolo persisted throughout the 1950s  blurring any sense of hard border between North Borneo and Sulu.

This active cross-sea relationship reinforced the idea that the Sulu people were naturally part of the same world as the Malay Peninsula. To them, joining Malaya or its eventual federation made historical sense.

The Rise of the “Greater Malaysia” Concept

In the late 1950s, Tunku Abdul Rahman began articulating the idea of a broader federation  one that would unite Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei into a single political entity called Malaysia.

When Tunku publicly proposed this plan in May 1961, the idea was received warmly in many Malay-Muslim circles across the region. Leaders from Sulu and Mindanao reportedly sent letters and emissaries expressing their desire to be included or to explore association with this “Greater Malaysia.”

Although such expressions were unofficial, they symbolised a yearning for reunion with a Malay polity that shared their faith and culture. Indeed, documents from British archives note that certain datus and sultans in the southern Philippines communicated informally with contacts in North Borneo, exploring possibilities of cooperation.

However, the political and legal reality stood in the way. Sulu and Mindanao were integral parts of the Republic of the Philippines  a sovereign state that would not tolerate any talk of secession. The U.S., maintaining influence over Manila, also discouraged any notion that could destabilise its ally in the Cold War era.

Colonial and Diplomatic Constraints

The overlapping colonial interests of Britain and America made the inclusion of Sulu or Mindanao in Malaysia impossible. Britain still held authority over North Borneo and Sarawak, while the Philippines was firmly within the U.S. strategic orbit.

For Malaya, whose independence was only a few years old, the priority was political stability  not provoking territorial disputes. Including territories under Philippine sovereignty could have derailed the entire Malaysia project.

Yet, it is crucial to note that the sentiment from Sulu and Mindanao was genuine. Their aspiration to join Malaya was never about expansionism; it was about belonging. The people felt more affinity with the Malay-Muslim political model than the secular, Western-oriented governance of Manila.

The Irony of History: The Sabah Claim

When Malaysia was formed in 1963, the Philippines protested  not because Sulu and Mindanao were left out, but because Sabah was included. Manila argued that Sabah was historically part of the Sulu Sultanate and therefore belonged to the Philippines.

Ironically, this claim emerged from the same cultural and historical connection that once inspired Sulu’s desire to join a Malay federation. The issue of Sabah’s ownership would later strain Malaysia-Philippines relations, culminating in the tragic 2013 Lahad Datu incident, when armed men from Sulu landed in Sabah to assert the Sultanate’s claim.

Thus, what began as an aspiration of unity evolved into a geopolitical dispute  the product of colonial boundaries imposed upon a once-fluid Malay world.

The Enduring Brotherhood: Malaysia and the Moro Struggle

Although Sulu and Mindanao never became part of Malaysia, their historical connection continued to influence regional politics. When the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and later the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) took up arms in the 1970s to demand autonomy, Malaysia became a natural mediator.

Malaysia’s role in hosting peace talks  from the 1976 Tripoli Agreement to the 2014 Bangsamoro Peace Deal  reflects a deep sense of kinship rather than mere diplomacy. Many Malaysian leaders, particularly from Sabah and Kelantan, felt moral responsibility toward their “Muslim brothers” across the Sulu Sea.

This sense of brotherhood has persisted. Even as Malaysia and the Philippines navigate complex border and security issues, the human and cultural ties between Malaysians and the peoples of Sulu and Mindanao remain strong  through family, trade, and shared faith.

Rethinking Borders: Lessons from a Forgotten Dream

The forgotten aspiration of Sulu and Mindanao to join Malaya before 1960 is more than a footnote in Southeast Asian history. It is a reminder of how colonial cartography fractured ancient civilisational linkages.

For centuries, the seas of the Malay Archipelago were not barriers but bridges  connecting people of the same language, faith, and values. It was only under colonial rule that these waters became borders.

Today, as ASEAN promotes regional unity and shared prosperity, it is worth recalling that the people of Sulu and Mindanao once dreamed of unity not in the language of economic integration, but in the language of identity. They sought a home in a political order that reflected their soul.

A Unity Beyond Borders

Before 1960, the idea of Sulu and Mindanao joining Malaya was neither rebellion nor fantasy. It was an echo of a deeper truth  that the peoples of the Malay world, separated by colonial lines, still felt bound by the same spiritual and cultural lineage.

While political realities prevented that dream from materialising, its essence continues to live on in Malaysia’s diplomatic and humanitarian engagement with Mindanao. The peace Malaysia helped broker in the Bangsamoro region can be seen as a fulfilment, in spirit, of the brotherhood once imagined.

As Southeast Asia faces new geopolitical pressures and identity challenges, the story of Sulu and Mindanao’s forgotten aspiration teaches us this: that unity in the Malay-Muslim world was once natural, not negotiated. And perhaps, in a new form  through peace, cooperation, and shared development  that unity can still be renewed.

The “What-If”: Sabah and Sarawak Without Malaysia

History is often a series of choices, and Southeast Asia is full of “what-ifs.” One of the most striking is this: if Sabah and Sarawak had not joined Malaysia in 1963, their fate might have closely resembled that of Sulu and Mindanao.

Both Sabah and Sarawak were rich in resources  fertile lands, forests, oil, and strategic maritime locations. Yet, without the protection and institutional framework offered by Malaysia:

1. Political Vulnerability: Like Sulu and Mindanao, Sabah and Sarawak would have been subject to stronger external pressures. Their sparse populations, combined with internal ethnic diversity (Kadazan-Dusun, Iban, Malay, Melanau, and Orang Ulu), could have made them susceptible to domination by larger powers, either the Philippines, Indonesia, or even continued Western influence.
2. Cultural and Religious Pressures: Sabah, with its historical ties to the Sulu Sultanate and its Muslim communities, might have faced identity conflicts similar to those of the Moro people. Sarawak’s indigenous groups might have experienced assimilation pressures or marginalisation under a different national government, echoing the struggles of Mindanao’s non-Christian populations.
3. Economic Exploitation: Without Malaysia’s federation structure, the resource-rich territories might have been exploited by foreign corporations, leaving local communities disenfranchised. Sulu and Mindanao’s historical experience under colonial and national neglect serves as a cautionary tale.
4. Fragmented Identity and Autonomy Movements: Just as Sulu and Mindanao experienced long-running movements for autonomy (MNLF, MILF) because their aspirations were not accommodated within the Philippine state, Sabah and Sarawak could have faced separatist tendencies, inter-ethnic conflicts, and political instability.

In other words, joining Malaysia offered Sabah and Sarawak not only security but also a framework to preserve local culture, protect economic interests, and participate in a larger Malay-Muslim political identity. Their inclusion prevented a potential repeat of the “southern Philippines scenario”  decades of unrest, marginalisation, and unfulfilled aspirations.

This “what-if” chapter underscores a key lesson: the formation of Malaysia was not merely a political convenience; it was also a historical safeguard for diverse communities, providing a home for territories that otherwise might have been left fragmented, contested, or marginalised  much like the peoples of Sulu and Mindanao.

Selected References

1. Saleeby, Najeeb Mitry. Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion. Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1905.
2. Warren, James Francis. The Sulu Zone, 1768–1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State. Singapore: NUS Press, 2007.
3. Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj. Viewpoints: Tunku Abdul Rahman’s Writings on Malaysia’s Formation. Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications, 1981.
4. Majul, Cesar Adib. Muslims in the Philippines. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1999.
5. Ahmad Ibrahim. The Administration of Islamic Law in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM), 1997.
6. Journals OpenEdition: “Politics, Security and Early Ideas of ‘Greater Malaysia’, 1945–1961.”
7. UM Journal Sejarah: “Perdagangan Sulu–Sabah dalam Abad ke-19 dan ke-20.”
8. Melaka Hari Ini (2023): “The Pan-Malayan Consciousness and the Idea of Malaysia.”